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Abstract
Virtual personal assistants (VPA) (e.g., Amazon Alexa
and Google Assistant) today mostly rely on the voice
channel to communicate with their users, which however
is known to be vulnerable, lacking proper authentication.
The rapid growth of VPA skill markets opens a new at-
tack avenue, potentially allowing a remote adversary to
publish attack skills to attack a large number of VPA
users through popular IoT devices such as Amazon Echo
and Google Home. In this paper, we report a study that
concludes such remote, large-scale attacks are indeed
realistic. More specifically, we implemented two new
attacks: voice squatting in which the adversary exploits
the way a skill is invoked (e.g., “open capital one”), using
a malicious skill with similarly pronounced name (e.g.,
“capital won”) or paraphrased name (e.g., “capital one
please”) to hijack the voice command meant for a differ-
ent skill, and voice masquerading in which a malicious
skill impersonates the VPA service or a legitimate skill
to steal the user’s data or eavesdrop on her conversations.
These attacks aim at the way VPAs work or the user’s mis-
conceptions about their functionalities, and are found to
pose a realistic threat by our experiments (including user
studies and real-world deployments) on Amazon Echo
and Google Home. The significance of our findings have
already been acknowledged by Amazon and Google, and
further evidenced by the risky skills discovered on Alexa
and Google markets by the new detection systems we
built. We further developed techniques for automatic de-
tection of these attacks, which already capture real-world
skills likely to pose such threats.
∗All the squatting and impersonation vulnerabilities we discovered
are reported to Amazon and Google and received their acknowledge-
ment [7].
1 Introduction
The wave of Internet of Things (IoT) has brought in a new
type of virtual personal assistant (VPA) services. Such a
service is typically delivered through a smart speaker that
interacts with the user using a voice user interface (VUI),
allowing the user to command the system with voice only:
for example, one can say “what will the weather be like
tomorrow?” “set an alarm for 7 am tomorrow”, etc., to get
the answer or execute corresponding tasks on the system.
In addition to their built-in functionalities, VPA services
are enhanced by ecosystems fostered by their providers,
such as Amazon and Google, under which third-party
developers can build new applications (called skills by
Amazon and actions by Google1) to offer further helps to
the end users, for example, order food, manage bank ac-
counts and text friends. In the past year, these ecosystems
are expanding at a breathtaking pace: Amazon claims that
already 25,000 skills have been uploaded to its skill mar-
ket to support its VPA system (including the Alexa VPA
service running through Amazon Echo) [1] and Google
also has more than one thousand actions available on its
market for its Google Home system (powered by Google
Assistant). These systems have already been deployed to
the households around the world, and utilized by tens of
millions of users. This quickly-gained popularity, how-
ever, could bring in new security and privacy risks, whose
implications have not been adequately investigated so far.
Security risks in VPA voice control. As mentioned ear-
lier, today’s VPA systems are designed to be primarily
commanded by voice. Protecting such VUIs is fundamen-
tally challenging, due to the lack of effective means to
authenticate the parties involved in the open and noisy
voice channel. Already prior research shows that the ad-
versary can generate obfuscated voice commands [13]
or even completely inaudible ultrasound [45] to attack
speech recognition systems. These attacks exploit un-
1Throughout the paper, we use the Amazon term skill to describe
third-party applications, including Google’s actions.
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protected communication to impersonate the user to the
voice-controlled system, under the constraint that an at-
tack device is placed close to the target (e.g., in the ultra-
sound attack, within 1.75 meters).
The emergence of the VPA ecosystem completely
changes the game, potentially opening new avenues for
remote attacks. Through the skill market, an adversary
can spread malicious code, which will be silently invoked
by voice commands received by a VPA device (e.g., Ama-
zon Echo or Google Home). As a result, the adversary
gains (potentially large-scale) access to the VPA devices
interacting with victims, allowing him to impersonate a
legitimate application or even the VPA service to them.
Again, the attack is made possible by the absence of effec-
tive authentication between the user and the VPA service
over the voice channel. Our research shows that such a
threat is indeed realistic.
Voice-based remote attacks. In our research, we ana-
lyzed the most popular VPA IoT systems – Alexa and
Google Assistant, focusing on the third-party skills de-
ployed to these devices for interacting with end users over
the voice channel. Our study demonstrates that through
publishing malicious skills, it is completely feasible for
an adversary to remotely attack the users of these popular
systems, collecting their private information through their
conversations with the systems. More specifically, we
identified two threats never known before, called voice
squatting attack (VSA) and voice masquerading attack
(VMA). In a VSA, the adversary exploits how a skill is
invoked (by a voice command), and the variations in the
ways the command is spoken (e.g., phonetic differences
caused by accent, courteous expression, etc.) to cause a
VPA system to trigger a malicious skill instead of the one
the user intends (Section 3.2). For example, one may say
“Alexa, open Capital One please”, which normally opens
the skill Capital One, but can trigger a malicious skill
Capital One Please once it is uploaded to the skill market.
A VMA aims at the interactions between the user and the
VPA system, which is designed to hand over all voice
commands to the currently running skill, including those
supposed to be processed by VPA system like stopping
the current skill and switching to a new one. In response
to the commands, a malicious skill can pretend to yield
control to another skill (switch) or the service (stop), yet
continue to operate stealthily to impersonate these targets
and get sensitive information from the user (Section 3.3).
We further investigated the feasibility of these attacks
through user studies, system analysis, and real-world ex-
ploits. More specifically, we first surveyed 156 Amazon
Echo and Google Home users and found that most of
them tend to use natural languages with diverse expres-
sions to interact with the devices: e.g., “play some sleep
sounds”. These expressions allow the adversary to mis-
lead the service and launch a wrong skill in response to
the user’s voice command, such as some sleep sounds in-
stead of sleep sounds. Our further analysis of both Alexa
and Google Assistant demonstrates that indeed these sys-
tems identify the skill to invoke by looking for the longest
string matched from a voice command (Section 3.2). Also
interestingly, our evaluation of both devices reveals that
Alexa and Google Assistant cannot accurately recognize
some skills’ invocation names and the malicious skills
carrying similar names (in terms of pronunciation) are
capable of hijacking the brands of these vulnerable skills.
Finally, we deployed four skills through the Amazon
market to attack a popular Alexa skill “Sleep and Relax-
ation Sounds” [8]. These skills have been invoked by
over 2,699 users in a month and collected 21,308 com-
mands. We built the skills in a way to avoid collecting
private information of the real-world users. Still, the com-
mands received provide strong evidence that indeed both
voice squatting and masquerading can happen in real life:
our study shows that the received commands include the
ones only eligible for “Sleep and Relaxation Sounds”,
and those for switching to a different skill or stopping
the current skill that can be leveraged to impersonate a
different skill (Section 3.4). Our analysis of existing skills
susceptible to the threat further indicates the significant
consequences of the attacks, including disclosure of one’s
home address, financial data, etc. The video demos of
these attacks are available online [7].
Responsible disclosure. We have reported our findings
to Amazon and Google, both of which acknowledged the
importance of the weaknesses we discovered. And we
are helping them to understand and mitigate such new
security risks.
Mitigation. In our research, we developed a suite of new
techniques to mitigate the realistic threats posed by VSA
and VMA. We built a skill-name scanner that converts
the invocation name string of a skill into a phonetic ex-
pression specified by ARPABET [5]. This expression
describes how a name is pronounced, allowing us to mea-
sure the phonetic distance between different skill names.
Those sounding similar or having a subset relation are
automatically detected by the scanner. This technique
can be used to vet the skills uploaded to a market. Inter-
estingly, when we ran it against all 19,670 custom skills
on the Amazon market, we discovered 4,718 skills with
squatting risks. These findings indicate that possibly
these attacks could already happen in the real world.
To counter the threat of the masquerading attack, we
designed and implemented a novel context-sensitive de-
tector to help a VPA service capture the commands for
system-level operations (e.g., invoke a skill) and the voice
content unrelated to a skill’s functionalities, which there-
fore should not be given to a skill (Section 5). Specifically,
our detection scheme consists of two components: the
2
Skill Response Checker (SRC) and the User Intention Clas-
sifier (UIC). SRC captures suspicious skill responses that
a malicious skill may craft, such as a fake skill recommen-
dation mimicking that from the VPA system. UIC instead
examines the information flow of the opposite direction,
i.e., utterances from the user, to accurately identify users’
intents of context switches. Built upon robust Natural
Language Processing (NLP) and machine learning tech-
niques, SRC and UIC form two lines of defense towards
the masquerading attack based on extensive empirical
evaluations.
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are out-
lined as follows:
• First study on remote VPA attacks. We report the first
security analysis on the VPA ecosystems and related popu-
lar IoT devices (Amazon Echo and Google Home), which
leads to the discovery of serious security weaknesses in
their VUIs and skill vetting. We present two new attacks,
voice squatting and voice masquerading. Both are demon-
strated to pose realistic threats to a large number of VPA
users from remote and both have serious security and
privacy implications. Our preliminary analysis of the
Amazon skill market further indicates the possibility that
similar attacks may already happen in the real world.
• New techniques for risk mitigation. We made the first
step towards protecting VPA users from these voice-based
attacks. We show that the new protection works effec-
tively against the threats in realistic environments. The
idea behind our techniques, such as context-sensitive com-
mand analysis, could inspire further enhancement of the
current designs to better protect VPA users.
2 Background
2.1 Virtual Personal Assistant Systems
VPA on IoT devices. Amazon and Google are two ma-
jor players in the market of smart speakers with voice-
controlled personal assistant capabilities. Since the debut
of the first Amazon Echo in 2015, Amazon has now taken
76% of the U.S. market with an estimate of 15-million de-
vices sold in the U.S. alone in 2017 [3]. In the meantime,
Google has made public Google Home in 2016, and now
grabbed the remaining 24% market share. Amazon Echo
Dot and Google Home Mini are later released in 2016
and 2017, respectively, as small, affordable alternatives to
their more expensive counterparts. Additionally, Amazon
has integrated VPA into IoT products from other vendors,
e.g. Sonos smart speaker, Ecobee thermostat [2].
A unique property of these four devices is that they all
forgo conventional I/O interfaces, such as the touchscreen,
and also have fewer buttons (to adjust volume or mute),
which serves to offer the user a hands-free experience. In
another word, one is supposed to command the device
mostly by speaking to it. For this purpose, the device is
equipped with a microphone circular array designed for
360-degree audio pickup and other technologies like beam
forming that enable far-field voice recognition. Such a
design allows the user to talk to the device anywhere
inside a room and still get a quick response.
Capabilities. Behind these smart devices is a virtual
personal assistant, called Alexa for Amazon and Google
Assistant for Google, engages users through a two-way
conversation. Unlike those serving a smartphone (Siri, for
example) that can be activated by a button push, the VPAs
for these IoT devices are started with a wake-word like
“Alexa” or “Hey Google”. These assistants have a range of
capabilities, from weather report, timer setting, to-do list
maintenance to voice shopping, hands-free messaging and
calling. The user can manage these capabilities through a
companion app running on her smartphone.
2.2 VPA Skills and Ecosystem
Both Amazon and Google enrich the VPAs’ capabilities
by introducing voice assistant skill (or action on Google).
Skills are essentially third-party apps, like those running
on smartphones, offering a variety of services the VPA
itself does not provide. Examples include Amex, Hands-
Free Calling, Nest Thermostat and Walmart. These skills
can be conveniently developed with the supports from
Amazon and Google, using Alexa Skills Kit [29] and Ac-
tions on Google. Indeed, we found that up to Novem-
ber 2017, Alexa already has 23,758 skills and Google
Assistant has 1,001. More importantly, new skills have
continuously been added to the market, with their total
numbers growing at a rate of 8% for Alexa and 42% for
Google Assistant, as we measured in a 45-day period.
Skill invocation. Skills can be started either explicitly or
implicitly. Explicit invocation takes place when a user
requires a skill by its name from a VPA: for example,
saying “Alexa, talk to Amex” to Alexa triggers the Amex
skill for making a payment or checking bank account
balances. Such a type of skills are also called custom
skills on Alexa.
Implicit invocation occurs when a user tells the voice
assistant to perform some tasks without directly calling
to a skill name. For example, “Hey Google, will it rain
tomorrow?” will invoke the Weather skill to respond
with a weather forecast. Google Assistant identifies and
activates a skill implicitly whenever the conversation with
the user is under the context deemed appropriate for the
skill. This invocation mode is also supported by the Alexa
for specific types of skills.
Skill interaction model. The VPA communicates with
its users based upon an interaction model, which defines
a loose protocol for the communication. Using the model,
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Figure 1: Infrastructure of VPA System
the VPA can interpret each voice request, translating it to
the command that can be handled by the VPA or a skill.
Specifically, to invoke a skill explicitly, the user is ex-
pected to use a wake-word, a trigger phrase and the skill’s
invocation name. For example, for the spoken sentence
“Hey Google, talk to personal chef”, “Hey Google” is the
wake-word, “talk to” is the trigger phrase, and “personal
chef” is the skill invocation name. Here, trigger phrase
is given by the VPA system, which often includes the
common terms for skill invocation like “open”, “ask”,
“tell”, “start” etc. Note that skill invocation name could
be different from skill name, which is intended to make it
simpler and easier for users to pronounce. For example,
“The Dog Feeder” has invocation name as the dog; “Scryb”
has invocation name as scribe.
When developing a skill, one needs to define intents and
sample utterances to map the user’s voice inputs to vari-
ous interfaces of the skill that take the actions the user ex-
pects. Such an interface is described by the intent. To link
a sentence to an intent, the developer specifies sample ut-
terances, which are essentially a set of sentence templates
describing the possible ways the user may talk to the skill.
There are also some built-in intents within the model
like WelcomeIntent, HelpIntent, StopIntent, etc.,
which already define many common sample utterances.
The developer can add more intent or simply specify one
default intent, in which case all user requests will be
mapped to this intent.
Skill service and the VPA ecosystem. A third-party skill
is essentially a web service hosted by its developer, with
its name registered with the VPA service provider (Ama-
zon or Google), as illustrated in Figure 1. When a user
invokes a VPA device with its wake-word, the device
captures her voice command and sends it to the VPA ser-
vice provider’s cloud for processing. The cloud performs
speech recognition to translate the voice record into text,
finds out the skill to be invoked, and then delivers the
text, together with the timestamp, device status, and other
meta-data, as a request to the skill’s web service. In re-
sponse to the request, the service returns a response whose
text content, either in plaintext or in the format of Speech
Synthesis Markup Language (SSML) [9], is converted to
speech by the cloud, and played to the user through the
device. SSML also allows the skill to attach audio files
(such as MP3) to the response, which is supported by both
Amazon and Google.
Both Amazon and Google have skill markets to publish
third-party skills. To publish a skill, the developer needs
to submit the information about her skill like name, invo-
cation name, description and the endpoint where the skill
is hosted for a certification process. This process aims at
ensuring that the skill is functional and meets the VPA
provider’s security requirements and policy guidelines.
Once a skill is published, users can simply activate it
by calling its invocation name. Note that unlike smart-
phone apps or website plugins that need to be installed
by users explicitly, skills can be automatically discovered
(according to the user’s voice command) and transparently
launched directly through IoT devices.
2.3 Adversary Model
We consider the adversary aiming a large-scale remote
attack on the VPA users through publishing malicious
skills. Such skills can be transparently invoked by the vic-
tim through voice commands, without being downloaded
and installed on the victim’s device. Therefore, they can
easily affect a large number of VPA IoT devices. For this
purpose, we assume that the adversary has the capability
to build the skill and upload it to the market. This can be
easily done in practice, as we found in our research. To
mitigate this threat, our protection needs to be adopted by
the VPA provider, for vetting submitted skills and evalu-
ating the voice commands received. This requires that the
VPA service itself is trusted.
3 Exploiting VPA Voice Control
3.1 Analysis of VPA Voice Control
Security risks of rogue skills. As mentioned earlier,
VPA skills are launched transparently when a user speaks
their invocation names (which can be different from their
names displayed on the skill market). Surprisingly, we
found that for Amazon, such names are not unique skill
identifiers: multiple skills with same invocation names
are on the Amazon market. Also, skills may have sim-
ilar or related names. For example, 66 different Alexa
skills are called cat facts, 5 called cat fact and 11 whose
invocation names contain the string “cat fact”, e.g. fun
cat facts, funny cat facts. When such a common name is
spoken, Alexa chooses one of the skills based on some
undisclosed policies (possibly random as observed in our
research). When a different but similar name is called,
however, longest string match is used to find the skill. For
example, “Tell me funny cat facts” will trigger funny cat
facts rather than cat facts. This problem is less serious
for Google, which does not allow duplicated invocation
names. However, it also cannot handle similar names.
Further discovered in our research is that some invocation
names cannot be effectively recognized by the speech
recognition systems of Amazon and Google. As a result,
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even a skill with a different name can be mistakenly in-
voked, when the name is pronounced similarly to that of
the intended one.
Also, we found that the designs of these VPA sys-
tems fail to take into full account their users’ perceptions
about how the systems work. Particularly, both Alexa and
Google Assistant run their skills in a simple operation
mode in which only one skill executes at a time and it
needs to stop before another skill can be launched. How-
ever, such a design is not user-friendly and there is no
evidence that the user understands that convenient context
switch is not supported by these systems.
Further, both Alexa and Google Assistant supports vol-
unteer skill termination. For Alexa, the termination com-
mand “Stop” is delivered to the skill, which is supposed
to stop itself accordingly. For Google Assistant, though
the user can explicitly terminate a skill by saying “Stop”,
oftentimes the skill is supposed to stop running once its
task is accomplished (e.g., reporting the current weather).
We found in our research that there is no strong indication
whether a skill has indeed quitted. Although Amazon
Echo and Google Home have a light indicator, both of
which will light up when the devices are speaking and
listening. However, they could be ignored by the user,
particularly when she is not looking at the devices or her
sight is blocked when talking.
Survey study. To understand user behaviors and per-
ceptions of voice-controlled VPA systems, which could
expose the users to security risks, we surveyed Amazon
Echo and Google Home users, focusing on the following
questions:
• What would you say when invoking a skill?
• Have you ever invoked a wrong skill?
• Did you try context switch when talking to a skill?
• Have you experienced any problem closing a skill?
• How do you know whether a skill has stopped?
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, we recruited adult
participants who own Amazon Echo or Google Home
devices and have used skills before and paid them one
dollar for completing the survey. To ensure that all partic-
ipants meet the requirements, we asked them to describe
several skills and their interactions with the skills and
removed those whose answers were deemed irrelevant. In
total, we have collected 105 valid responses from Amazon
Echo users and 51 valid responses from Google Home
users with diverse background (age ranges from 18 to 74
with average age as 37 years; 46% are female and 54%
are male; education ranges from high school to graduate
degree; 21 categories of occupation). On average, each
participant reported to have 1.5 devices and used 5.8 skills
per week.
In the first part of the survey, we studied how users
invoke a skill. For this purpose, we used two popular
Table 1: Survey responses of Amazon Echo and Google Home
users
Amazon Google
Invoke a skill with natural sentences:
Yes, “open Sleep Sounds please” 64% 55%
Yes, “open Sleep Sounds for me” 30% 25%
Yes, “open Sleep Sounds app” 26% 20%
Yes, “open my Sleep Sounds” 29% 20%
Yes, “open the Sleep Sounds” 20% 14%
Yes, “play some Sleep Sounds” 42% 35%
Yes, “tell me a Cat Facts” 36% 24%
No, “open Sleep Sounds” 13% 14%
Invoke a skill that did not intend to:
Yes 29% 27%
No 71% 73%
Tried to invoke a skill while interacting with
another skill:
Yes 26% 24%
No 74% 76%
Tried to adjust volume by voice while
interacting with another skill:
Yes 48% 51%
No 52% 49%
Unsuccessful quitting a skill:
Yes 30% 29%
No 70% 71%
Indicator of the end of a conversation:
VPA says “Goodbye” or something similar 23% 37%
VPA does not talk anymore 52% 45%
The light on VPA device is off 25% 18%
skills “Sleep Sounds”, “Cat Facts” (“Facts about Sloths”
on Google Home), and let the participants choose the
invocation utterances they tend to use for launching these
skills (e.g., “open Sleep Sounds please”) and required
them to provide additional examples. We then asked the
participants whether they ever triggered a wrong skill.
In the following part of the survey, we tried to find out
whether the participants attempted to switch context when
interacting with a skill, that is, invoking a different skill
or directly talking to the VPA service (e.g., adjusting vol-
ume). The last part of the survey was designed to study
the user experience in stopping the current skill, including
the termination utterances they tend to use, troubles they
encountered during the termination process and impor-
tantly, the indicator they used to determine whether the
skill has stopped. Sample survey questions are listed in
Appendix A.
Table 1 summarizes the responses from both Amazon
Echo and Google Home users. The results show that more
than 85% of them tend to use natural utterances to open
a skill (e.g., “open Sleep Sounds please”), instead of the
standard one (like “open Sleep Sounds”). This indicates
that it is completely realistic for the user to launch a wrong
skill whose name is better matched to the utterances than
that of the intended skill (e.g., Sleep Sounds). Indeed,
28% users reported that they did open unintended skills
when talking to their devices.
Also interestingly, our survey shows that nearly half
of the participants tried to switch to another skill or to
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the VPA service (e.g. adjusting volume) when interacting
with a skill. Such an attempt failed since such context
switch is neither supported by Alexa nor Google Assistant.
However, it is imaginable that a malicious skill receiving
such voice commands could take advantage of this op-
portunity to impersonate the skill the user wants to run,
or even the VPA service (e.g., cheating the user into dis-
closing personal information for executing commands).
Finally, 30% of the participants were found to experience
troubles in skill termination and 78% did not use the light
indicators on the devices as the primary indicator of skill
termination. Again, the study demonstrates the feasibility
of a malicious skill to fake its termination and stealthily
collect the user’s information.
Following we show how the adversary can exploit the
gap between the user perception and the real operations
of the system to launch voice squatting and masquerading
attacks.
3.2 Voice Squatting
Invocation confusion. As mentioned earlier, a skill is
triggered by its invocation name, which is supposed to
be unambiguous and easy to recognize by the devices.
Both Amazon and Google suggests that skill developers
test invocation names and ensure that their skills can be
launched with a high success rate. However, we found
that an adversary can intentionally induce confusion by
using the name or similar one of a target skill, to trick
the user into invoking an attack skill when trying to open
the target. For example, the adversary who aims at
Capital One could register a skill Capital Won, Capitol
One, or Captain One. All such names when spoken by
the user could become less distinguishable, particularly
in the presence of noise, due to the limitations of today’s
speech recognition techniques.
Also, this voice squatting attack can easily exploit the
longest string match strategy of today’s VPAs, as men-
tioned earlier. Based on our user survey study, around
60% of Alexa and Google Home users have used the word
“please” when launching a skill, and 26% of them attach
“my” before the skill’s invocation name. So, the adversary
can register the skills like Capital One Please to hijack
the invocation command meant for Capital One.
Note that to make it less suspicious, homophones or
words pronounced similarly can be used here, e.g. Capital
One Police. Again, this approach defeats Google’s skill
vetting, allowing the adversary to publish the skill with
an invocation name unique in spelling but still confusing
(with a different skill) in pronunciation.
To find out whether such squatting attacks can evade
skill vetting, we registered 5 skills with Amazon and
1 with Google. These skills’ invocation names and the
target’s name are shown in Table 2. All these skills passed
the Amazon and Google’s vetting process, which suggests
Table 2: Skill name, invocation name and victim invocation
name of Skills we registered on Amazon and Google
Skill Name Invocation Name Target Invocation Name
Amazon
Smart Gap smart gap smart cap
Soothing Sleep Sounds sleep sounds please sleep sounds
Soothing Sleep Sounds soothing sleep sounds sleep sounds
My Sleep Sounds the sleep sounds sleep sounds
Super Sleep Sounds sleep sounds sleep sounds
Incredible Fast Sleep incredible fast sleep N/A
Google
Walk Log walk log work log
that the VSA code can be realistically deployed.
Consequences. Through voice squatting, the attack skill
can impersonate another skill and fake its VUI to collect
the private information the user only shares with the target
skill. Some Amazon and Google skills request private
information from the user to do their jobs. For example,
Find My Phone asks for phone number; Transit Helper
asks for home address; Daily Cutiemals seeks email ad-
dress from user. These skills, once impersonated, could
cause serious information leaks to untrusted parties.
For Amazon Alexa, a falsely invoked skill can perform
a Phishing attack on the user by leveraging the VPA’s
card system. Alexa allows a running skill to include a
home card in its response to the user, which is displayed
through Amazon’s companion app on smartphone or web
browser, to describe or enhance ongoing voice interac-
tions. As an example, Figure 2 shows a card from “Transit
Helper”. Such a card can be used by the attack skill to
deliver false information to the user: e.g., fake customer
contact number or website address, when impersonating
a reputable one, such as Capital One. This can serve as
the first step of a Phishing attack, which can ultimately
lead to the disclosure of sensitive user data. For example,
the adversary could send you an account expiration notifi-
cation, together with a renewal link, to cheat the user out
of her account credentials.
Figure 2: A simple card example
Another potential risk of the VSA is defamation: the
poor performance of the attack skill could cause the user
to blame the legitimate one it impersonates. This could
result in bad reviews, giving the legitimate skill’s com-
petitors an advantage.
Evaluation methodology. In our research, we investi-
gated how realistic a squatting attack would be on today’s
VPA IoT systems. For this purpose, we studied two types
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Table 3: Evaluation results of invoking skills with TTS service and human voice
Device Source Invocation Name “Open” + Invocation Name Mis-recognized Invocation Name
# of incorrect
utterances
# of incorrect
skills
# of incorrect
utterances
# of incorrect
skills
# of completely
incorrect skills
# of attack
skills invoked
# of utterances
invoked attack
skill
Alexa
Amazon TTS 232/500 62/100 125/500 33/100 17/100 10/17 45/85
Google TTS 164/500 41/100 104/500 26/100 17/100 12/17 63/85
Human (Avg) N/A N/A 90/200 58/100 31/100 N/A N/A
Google
Amazon TTS 96/500 24/100 42/500 12/100 7/100 4/7 20/35
Google TTS 62/500 19/100 26/500 6/100 4/100 2/4 10/20
Human (Avg) N/A N/A 19/200 14/100 6/100 N/A N/A
of the attacks: voice squatting in which an attack skill
carries a phonetically similar invocation name to that of
its target skill, and word squatting where the attack invo-
cation name includes the target’s name and some strategi-
cally selected additional words (e.g., “cat facts please”).
To find out whether these attacks work on real systems,
we conducted a set of experiments, as described below.
To study voice squatting, we randomly sampled 100
skills each from the markets of Alexa and Google assis-
tant, and utilized Amazon and Google’s Text-to-Speech
(TTS) services and the human voice to pronounce their
skill names to their VPA devices, so as to understand how
effectively the VPAs can recognize these names. The idea
is to identify those continuously misrecognized by the
VPAs, and then strategically register phonetically similar
names for the attack skills. We selected such names us-
ing the text outputs produced by Amazon and Google’s
speech recognition services when the vulnerable (hard to
recognize) names were spoken. To this end, we built a
skill to receive voice commands. The skill was invoked
in our experiment before voice commands were played,
which were converted into text by the recognition services
and handed over to the skill.
The voice commands used in our research were pro-
duced by either human subjects or Amazon and Google’s
TTS services (both claiming to generate natural and
human-like voice). Some of these commands included a
term “open” in front of an invocation name, forming an
invocation utterance. In our study, for each of the 100
skills, we recorded 20 voice commands from each TTS
service (ten invocation names only and ten invocation
utterances) and two commands (invocation utterances)
from each of five participants of our survey study.
As mentioned earlier, we used the text outputs of mis-
recognized invocation names to name our attack skills.
Such skills were evaluated in the test modes of Alexa and
Google Assistant. We did not submit them to the markets
simply because it was time-consuming to publish over 60
skills on the markets. Later we describe the five attack
skills submitted to these markets, which demonstrate their
vetting protection is not effective.
To study word squatting, we randomly sampled ten
skills from each skill markets as the attack targets. For
each skill, we built four new skills whose invocation
names include the target’s name together with the terms
identified from our survey study (Section 3.1): for ex-
ample, “cat facts please” and “my cat facts”. In the ex-
periment, these names were converted into voice com-
mands using TTS and played to the VPA devices (e.g.,
“Alexa, open cat facts please”), which allows us to find out
whether the attack skills can indeed be triggered. Note
that the scale of this study is limited by the time it takes to
upload attack invocation names to the VPA’s cloud. Nev-
ertheless, our findings provide evidence for the real-world
implications of the attack.
Experiment results. We recruited five participants for
our experiments, and each was recorded 400 invocation
commands. All the participants are fluent in English
and among them, four are native speakers. When using
the TTS services, a MacBook Pro served as the sound
source. The voice commands from the participants and
the TTS services were played to an Amazon Echo Dot
and a Google Home Mini, with the devices placed one
foot away from the sound source. The experiments were
conducted in a quiet meeting room.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the experiment on
voice squatting. As we can see here, the voice commands
with invocation names only often cannot be accurately
recognized: e.g., Alexa only correctly identified around
54% utterances (the voice command) produced by Ama-
zon TTS. On the other hand, an invocation utterance (in-
cluding the term “open”) worked much better, with the
recognition rate rising to 75% for Alexa (under Amazon
TTS). Overall, for the voice commands generated by both
Amazon and Google’s TTS services, we found that Alexa
made more errors (30%) than Google Assistant (9%). As
mentioned earlier, the results of such misrecognition, for
the invocation names that these VPAs always could not get
right, were utilized in our research to register attack skills’
names. For example, the skill “entrematic opener” was
recognized by Google as “intra Matic opener”, which was
then used as the name for a malicious skill. In this way,
we identified 17 such vulnerable Alexa skills under both
Amazon and Google’s TTS, and 7 Google skills under
Amazon TTS and 4 under Google TTS. When attacking
these skills, our study shows that half of the malicious
skills were triggered by the voice commands meant for
these target skills every time: e.g., “Florida state quiz”
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Table 4: Evaluation results of invoking skills with extra words
Utterance # of malicious skills invoked (10)
Alexa Google Assistant
invocation name + “please” 10 0
“my” + invocation name 7 0
“the” + invocation name 10 0
invocation name + “app” 10 10
“mai” + invocation name N/A 10
invocation name + “plese” N/A 10
hijacked the call to “Florida snake quiz”; “read your app”
was run when invoking “rent Europe”.
This attack turned out to be more effective on the voice
commands spoken by humans. Given a participant, on av-
erage, 31 (out of 100) Alexa skills and 6 Google Assistant
skills she spoke were recognized incorrectly. Although
in normal situations, right skills can still be identified de-
spite the misrecognition, in our attacks, with over 50% of
the malicious skills were mistakenly launched every time,
as observed in our experiments on 5 randomly sampled
vulnerable target skills for each participant.
Table 4 summarizes the results of our experiments on
the word squatting attack. On Alexa, a malicious skill
with the extended name (that is, the target skill’s invoca-
tion name together with terms “please”, “app”, “my” and
“the”) was almost always launched by the voice commands
involving these terms and the target names. On Google
Assistant, however, only the utterance with word “app”
succeeded in triggering the corresponding malicious skill,
which demonstrates that Google Assistant is more robust
against such an attack. However, when we replaced “my”
with “mai” and “please” with “plese”, all such malicious
skills were successfully invoked by the commands for
their target skills (see Table 4). This indicates that the
protection Google puts in place (filtering out those with
suspicious terms) can be easily circumvented.
3.3 Voice Masquerading
Unawareness of a VPA system’s capabilities and behav-
iors could subject users to voice masquerading attacks.
Here, we demonstrate two such attacks that impersonate
the VPA systems or other skills to cheat users into giving
away private information or to eavesdrop on the user’s
conversations.
In-communication skill switch. Given some users’ per-
ceptions that the VPA system supports skill switch during
interactions, a running skill can pretend to hand over con-
trol to the target skill in response to a switch command,
so as to impersonate that skill. As a result, sensitive user
information only supposed to be shared with target skill
could be exposed to the attack skill. This masquerading
attack is opportunistic. However, the threat is realistic,
according to our survey study (Section 3.1) and our real-
world attack (Section 3.4). Also, the adversary can always
use the attack skill to impersonate as many legitimate
skills as possible, to raise the odds of a successful attack.
Google Assistant seems to have protection in place
against the impersonation. Specifically, it signals the
launch of a skill by speaking “Sure, here is”, together
with the skill name and a special earcon, and skill termi-
nation with another earcon. Further, the VPA talks to the
user in a distinctive accent to differentiate it from skills.
This protection, however, can be easily defeated. In our
research, we pre-recorded the signal sentence with the
earcons and utilized SSML to play the recording, which
could not be detected by the participants in our study. We
even found that using the emulator provided by Google,
the adversary can put any content in the invocation name
field of his skill and let Google Assistant speak the content
in the system’s accent.
Faking termination. Both Alexa and Google Assistant
support volunteer skill termination, allowing a skill to
stop itself right after making a voice response to the user.
As mentioned earlier, the content of the response comes
from the skill developer’s server, as a JSON object, which
is then spoken by the VPA system. In the object there is a
field shouldEndSession (or expect user response
for Google Assistant). By setting it to true (or false
on Google Assistant), a skill ends itself after the re-
sponse. This approach is widely used by popular skills,
e.g. weather skills, education skills and trivia skills. In
addition, according to our survey study, 78% of the par-
ticipants rely on the response of the skill (e.g. “Goodbye”
or silence) to determine whether a skill has stopped. This
allows an attack skill to fake its termination by providing
“Goodbye” or silent audio in its response.
When sending back a response, both Alexa and Google
Assistant let a skill include a reprompt (text content or
an audio file), which is played when the VPA does not
receive any voice command from the user within a period
of time. For example, Alexa reprompts the user after 6
seconds and Google Assistant does this after 8 seconds.
If the user continues to keep quiet, after another 6 sec-
onds for Alexa and one additional reprompt from Google
and follow-up 8-second waiting, the running skill will
be forcefully terminated by the VPA. On the other hand,
we found in our research that as long as the user says
something (even not meant for the skill) during that pe-
riod, the skill is allowed to send another response together
with a reprompt. To stay alive as long as possible after
faking termination, the attack skill we built includes in its
reprompt a silent audio file (up to 90 seconds for Alexa
and 120 seconds for Google Assistant), so it can continue
to run at least 102 seconds on Alexa and 264 seconds
on Google. This running time can be further extended
considering the attack skill attaching the silent audio right
after its last voice response to the user (e.g., “Goodbye”),
which gives it 192 seconds on Alexa and 384 on Google
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Table 5: Real-world attack skills usage
Skill Invocation Name # of Users # of Requests Req/User Avg. UnknownReq/User
Avg. Instant Quit
Session/User
Avg. No Play Quit
Session/User
sleep sounds please 325 3,179 9.58 1.11 0.61 0.73
soothing sleep sounds 294 3,141 10.44 1.28 0.73 0.87
the sleep sounds 144 1,248 8.49 1.11 0.33 0.45
sleep sounds 109 1,171 10.18 1.59 0.51 0.82
incredible fast sleep 200 1,254 6.12 0.56 0.06 0.11
Assistant), and indefinitely whenever Alexa or Google
Assistant picks up some sound made by the user. In this
case, the skill can reply with the silent audio and in the
meantime, record whatever it hears.
Additionally, both Alexa and Google Assistant allow
users to explicitly terminate a skill by saying “stop”, “can-
cel”, “exit”, etc. However, Alexa actually hands over most
such commands to the running skill to let it stop itself
through the built-in StopIntent (including “stop”, “off”,
etc.) and CancelIntent (including “cancel”, “never
mind” etc.). Only “exit” is processed by the VPA ser-
vice and used to forcefully stop the skill. Through survey
study, we found that 91% of Alexa users used “stop” to ter-
minate a skill, 36% chose “cancel”, and only 14% opted
for “exit”, which suggests that the user perception is not
aligned with the way Alexa works and therefore leaves
the door open for the VMA. Also, although both Alexa
and Google skill markets vet the skills published there
through testing their functionalities, unlike mobile apps,
a skill actually runs on the developer’s server, so it can
easily change its functionality after the vetting. This indi-
cates that all such malicious activities cannot be prevented
by the markets.
Consequences. By launching the VMA, the adversary
could impersonate the VPA system and pretend to invoke
another skill if users speak out an invocation utterance dur-
ing the interaction or after the fake termination of the skill.
Consequently, all the information stealing and Phishing
attacks caused by the VSA (Section 3.2) can also happen
here. Additionally, an attack skill could masquerade as
the VPA service to recommend to the user other malicious
skills or the legitimate skills the user may share sensitive
data with. These skills are then impersonated by the attack
skill to steal the data. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the
adversary could eavesdrop on the user’s conversation by
faking termination and providing a silent audio response.
Such an attack can be sustained for a long time if the user
continues to talk during the skill’s waiting period.
3.4 Real-World Attacks
Objectives and methodology. We registered and pub-
lished four skills on Alexa to simulate the popular skill
“Sleep and Relaxation Sounds” (the one receiving most
reviews on the market as of Nov. 2017) whose invocation
name is “sleep sounds” , as shown in Table 2. Our skills
are all legitimate, playing sleep sounds just like the pop-
ular target. Although their invocation names are related
to the target (see Table 2), their welcome messages were
deliberately made to be different from that of the target,
to differentiate them from the popular skill. Also, the
number of different sleep sounds supported by our skills
is way smaller than the target.
Also to find out whether these skills were mistakenly
invoked, we registered another skill as a control, whose
invocation name “incredible fast sleep” would not be
confused with those of other skills. Therefore, it was only
triggered by users intentionally.
Findings. In our study, we collected three weeks of skill
usage data. The results are shown in Table 5. As we
can see from the table, some users indeed took our skill
as the target, which is evidenced by the higher number
of unknown requests the attack skill got (more than 20%
of them for the sounds only provided by the target skill)
and the higher chance of quitting the current session im-
mediately without playing (once the user realized that it
was a wrong skill, possible from the different welcome
message). This becomes even more evident when we look
at “sleep sounds please”, a voice command those intended
for “sleep sounds” are likely to say. Compared with the
control, it was invoked by more users, received more
requests per user, also much higher rates of unknown
requests and early quits.
In addition, out of the 9,582 user requests we collected,
52 was for skill switch, trying to invoke another skill dur-
ing the interactions with our skill, and 485 tried to termi-
nate the skill using StopIntent or CancelIntent, all
of which could be exploited for launching VMAs (though
we did not do that). Interestingly, we found that some
users so strongly believed in the skill switch that they
even cursed Alexa for not doing that after several tries.
Ethical issues. All human subject studies throughout the
paper were approved by our IRB. All the skills we pub-
lished did not collect any private, identifiable information
and only provided legitimate functionalities similar to
“Sleep and Relaxation Sounds”. Although the skills could
launch VMAs e.g. faking in-communication skill switch
and termination, they were designed not to do so. Instead,
we just verified that such attack opportunities are indeed
there.
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4 Finding Voice Squatting Skills
To better understand potential voice squatting risks al-
ready in the wild and help automatically detect such skills,
we developed a skill-name scanner and used it to analyze
tens of thousands of skills from Amazon and Google
markets. Following we elaborate on this study.
4.1 Data Collection
The Alexa skill market can be accessed through
amazon.com and its companion App, which includes 23
categories of skills spanning from Business & Finance to
Weather. In our research, we ran a web crawler to collect
the metadata (such as skill name, author, invocation name,
sample utterances, description, and review) of all skills
on the market. Up to November 11th, 2017, we gathered
23,758 skills, including 19,670 3rd party (custom) skills.
More complicated is to collect data from Google assis-
tant, which only lists skills in its Google Assistant app.
Each skill there can be shared (to other users, e.g., through
email) using an automatically generated URL pointing to
the skill’s web page. In our research, we utilized Android-
ViewClient [4] to automatically click the share button for
each skill to acquire its URL, and then ran our crawler to
download data from its web page. Altogether, we got the
data for 1,001 skills up to November 25th, 2017.
4.2 Methodology
Idea. As we discussed earlier, the adversary can launch
VSA by crafting invocation names with a similar pronun-
ciation as that of a target skill or using different variations
(e.g., “sleep sounds please”) of the target’s invocation
utterances. We call such a name Competitive Invoca-
tion Name (CIN). In our research, we built a scanner that
takes two steps to capture the CINs for a given invocation
name: utterance paraphrasing and pronunciation com-
parison. The former identifies suspicious variations of a
given invocation name, and the latter finds the similarity
in pronunciation between two different names. Here we
describe how the scanner works.
Utterance paraphrasing. To find variations of an invoca-
tion name, an intuitive approach is to paraphrase common
invocation utterances of the target skill. For example,
given the skill chase bank, a typical invocation utterance
would be open chase bank. Through paraphrasing, we can
also get similar voice commands such as open the chase
skill for me. This helps identify other variations such as
chase skill or the chase skill for me. However, unlike the
general text paraphrase problem whose objective is to pre-
serve semantic consistency while the syntactic structure
of a phrase changes, paraphrasing invocation utterances
further requires the variations to follow a similar syntactic
pattern so that the VPA systems can still recognize them
as the commands for launching skills. In our research,
we explored several popular paraphrase methodologies
including bilingual pivoting method [11] and newly pro-
posed ones using deep neural networks [32] and [36].
None of them, however, can ensure that the variation gen-
erated can still be recognized by the VPA as an invocation
utterance. Thus, we took a simple yet effective approach
in our research, which creates variations using the invo-
cation commands collected from our survey study 3.1.
Specifically, we gathered 11 prefixes of these commands,
e.g. “my” and 6 suffixes, e.g. “please”, and applied them
to a target skill’s invocation name to build its variations
recognizable to the VPA systems. Each of these variations
can lead to other variations by replacing the words in its
name with those having similar pronunciations.
Pronunciation comparison. To identify the names
with similar pronunciation, our scanner converts a given
name into a phonemic presentation using the ARPABET
phoneme code [5]. Serving this purpose is the CMU
pronunciation dictionary [6] our approach uses to find
the phoneme code for each word in the name. The dic-
tionary includes over 134,000 words, which, however,
still misses some name words used by skills. Among
9,120 unique words used to compose invocation names,
1,564 are not included in this dictionary. To get their
pronunciations, we followed an approach proposed in
the prior research [44] to train a grapheme-to-phoneme
model using a recurrent neural network with long short
term memory(LSTM) units. Running this model on Stan-
ford GloVe dataset [34], we added to our phoneme code
dataset additional 2.19 million words.
After turning each name into its phonemic represen-
tation, our scanner compares it with other names to find
those that sound similarly. To this end, we use edit dis-
tance to measure the pronunciation similarity between
two phrases, i.e., the minimum cost in terms of phoneme
editing operations to transform one name to the other.
However, different phoneme edit operations should not
be given the same cost. For example, substituting a con-
sonant for a vowel could cause the new pronunciation
sounds more differently from the old one, compared to
replacing a vowel to another vowel. To address this issue,
we use a weighted cost matrix for the operations on differ-
ent phoneme pairs. Specifically, denote each item in the
matrix by WC(α,β ), which is the weighted cost by substi-
tuting phoneme α with phoneme β . Note that the cost for
insertion and deletion can be represented as WC(none,β )
and WC(α,none). WC(α,β ) is then derived based on the
assumption (also made in prior research [23]) that an edit
operation is less significant when it frequently appears
between two alternative pronunciations of a given English
word.
We collected 9,181 pairs of alternative pronunciations
from the CMU dictionary. For each pair, we applied the
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Table 6: Squatting risks on skill markets
Market # ofSkills
# of unique
invocation names
Transformation
cost Skills has CIN in market
Skills has CIN in market
excluding same spelling
Skills has CIN in market by
utterance paraphrasing
Count Avg. Max Count Avg. Max Count Avg. Max
Alexa 19,670 17,268 0 3,718(19%) 5.36 66 531(2.7%) 1.31 66 345(1.8%) 1.04 31 4,718(24%) 6.14 81 2,630(13%) 3.70 81 938(4.8%) 2.02 68
Needleman-Wunsch algorithm to identify the minimum
edit distance and related edit path. Then, we define
WC(α,β ) = 1− SF(α,β )+SF(β ,α)
F(α)+F(β )
where F(α) is the frequency of phoneme α while
SF(α,β ) is the frequency of substitutions of α with β ,
both in edit paths of all pronunciation pairs.
After deriving the cost matrix, we compare the pro-
nunciations of the invocation names for the skills on the
market, looking for the similar names in terms of similar
pronunciations and the paraphrasing relations.
Limitation. As mentioned earlier, our utterance para-
phrasing approach ensures that the CINs produced will
be recognized by the VPA systems to trigger skills. In the
meantime, this empirical treatment cannot cover all possi-
ble attack variations, a problem that needs to be studied
in the future research.
4.3 Measurement and Discoveries
To understand the voice squatting risks already there in
the wild, we conducted a measurement study on Alexa
and Google Assistant skills using the scanner. In the
study, we chose the similarity thresholds (transformation
cost) based upon the results of our experiment on VSA
(Section 3.2): we calculated the cost for transforming
misrecognized invocation names to those identified from
the voice commands produced by the TTS service and
human users, which are 1.8 and 3.4, respectively. Then
we conservatively set the thresholds to 0 (identical pro-
nunciations) and 1.
Squatting risks on skill markets. As shown in Table 6,
3,655 (out of 19,670) Alexa skills have CINs on the same
market, which also include skills that have identical invo-
cation names (in spelling). After removing the skills with
the identical names, still 531 skills have CINs, each on av-
erage related to 1.31 CINs. The one with the most CINs is
“cat fax”: we found that 66 skills are named “cat facts”. In-
terestingly, there are 345 skills whose CINs apparently are
the utterance paraphrasing of other skills’ names. Further,
when raising the threshold to 1 (still well below what is
reported in our experiment), we observed that the number
of skills with CINs increases dramatically, suggesting that
skill invocations through Alexa can be more complicated
and confusing than thought. By comparison, Google has
only 1,001 skills on its market and does not allow them to
have identical invocation names. Thus, we are only able
to find 4 skills with similarly pronounced CINs under the
threshold 1.
Our study shows that the voice squatting risk is realistic,
which could already pose threats to tens of millions of
VPA users in the wild. So it becomes important for skill
markets to beef up their vetting process (possibly using a
technique similar to our scanner) to mitigate such threats.
Case studies. From the CINs discovered by our scanner,
we found a few interesting cases. Particularly, there is
evidence that the squatting attack might already happen
in the wild: as an example, relating to a popular skill “dog
fact” is another skill called “me a dog fact”. This invoca-
tion name does not make any sense unless the developer
intends to hijack the command intended for “dog fact”
like “tell me a dog fact”.
Also intriguing is the observation that some skills delib-
erately utilize the invocation names unrelated to their func-
tionalities but following those of popular skills. Promi-
nent examples include the “SCUBA Diving Trivia” skill
and “Soccer Geek” skill, all carrying an invocation name
“space geek”. This name is actually used by another 18
skills that provide facts about the universe.
5 Defending against Voice Masquerading
To defeat VMA, we built a context-sensitive detector upon
the VPA infrastructure. Our detector takes a skill’s re-
sponse and the user’s utterance as its input to determine
whether an impersonation risk is present. Once a prob-
lem is found, the detector alerts the user of the risk. Our
detection scheme consists of two components: the Skill
Response Checker (SRC) and the User Intention Classi-
fier (UIC). SRC captures suspicious skill responses that a
malicious skill may craft such as a fake skill recommen-
dation mimicking that from the VPA system. UIC instead
examines the information flow of the opposite direction,
i.e., utterances from the user, to accurately identify users’
intents of context switches. Despite operating indepen-
dently, SRC and UIC form two lines of defense towards
VMA.
5.1 Skill Response Checker (SRC)
As discussed in Section 3.3, a malicious skill could fake
a skill switch or termination to cheat users into giving
away private information or to eavesdrop on the user’s
conversations. To defend such attacks, our core idea is to
eliminate or at least reduce the possibility of a malicious
skill mimicking responses from VPA systems, allowing
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users to be explicitly notified of VPA system events (e.g.,
a context switch and termination) through unique audi-
ble signals. Technically, SRC adopts a blacklist-based
approach by maintaining a blacklist of responses that the
VPA considers suspicious, including system utterances
and silent utterance. Whenever a response from a skill
matches any utterance on the blacklist, SRC alarms the
VPA system, which can take further actions such as to
verify the ongoing conversation with the user before hand-
ing her response to the skill. The challenge here is how
to perform blacklist hit tests, as the attacker can possi-
bly “morphing” (instead of exactly copying) the original
system utterances. SRC thus performs fuzzy matching
through semantic analysis on the content of the response
against those on the blacklist. Specifically, we train a sen-
tence embedding model using a recurrent neural network
with bi-directional LSTM units [15] on Stanford Natu-
ral Language Inference (SNLI) dataset [12] to represent
both the utterance and the command’s contents as high-
dimensional vectors. We then calculate their absolute
cosine similarity as their sentence relevance (SR). Once
the maximum SR of a response against the utterances on
the blacklist exceeds a threshold, the response is labeled
as suspicious and user verification will take place if SRC
further detects a user command.
To determine the threshold, we first derive the SR of
legitimate skill responses against responses in the black-
list. We extract legitimate skill responses from real-world
conversations we collected in Section 3.4. We further
diversify the dataset by adding conversation transcripts
we manually interacted and logged with 20 popular skills
from different skill markets. The highest SR of these
legitimate responses against those in the blacklist is 0.79.
Next, we use a neural paraphrase model [36] to generate
variations of responses in the blacklist and derive their
SR against their original responses, of which the lowest is
0.83. Therefore a threshold of 0.8 would be good enough
to differentiate suspicious responses from legitimate ones.
5.2 User Intention Classifier (UIC)
UIC further protects the user attempting to switch con-
texts from an impersonation attack. Complementing SRC,
UIC aims at improving the inference of whether the user
intends to switch to the system or to a different skill, by
thoroughly mining conversations’ semantics and contexts,
as opposed to using the simple skill invocation models
employed by today’s VPA (Section 2.2). Ideally, if a
user’s intention of context switches can be perfectly inter-
preted by the VPA, then an impersonation attack would
not succeed.
We realize that building a robust and full-fledged UIC is
very challenging and beyond the scope of this paper. This
is not only because of variations of the natural-language-
based commands (e.g., “open sleep sounds” vs. “sleep
sounds please”), but also due to the fact that some com-
mands could be legitimate for both the current on-going
skill and the system command of VPA (indicating a con-
text switch). For example, when interacting with Sleep
Sounds, one may say “play thunderstorm sounds”, which
asks the skill to play the requested sound; meanwhile, the
same command can also make the VPA launch a different
skill “Thunderstorm Sounds”. We next demonstrate that
it is promising for a learning-based approach to tackle
such ambiguities using contextual information.
Feature Selection. At a high level, we observed from
real-world conversations that if a user intends to have a
context switch, her utterance will tend to be more seman-
tically related to system commands (e.g. “open sleep
sounds”) rather than the current skill, and vice versa.
Based on this observation, features in UIC are composed
by comparing the semantics of the user’s utterance to both
the context of system commands and the context of the
skill that the user is currently interacting with.
We first derive features from a semantic comparison
between the user utterance and all known system com-
mands. To this end, we build a system command list
from the VPA’s user manual, developers’ documentation
and real-world conversations collected in our study (sec-
tion 3.4). Given an utterance, its maximum and average
SRs (Section 5.1) against all system commands on the list
are used by UIC as features for classification. Another
feature we add is an indicator that is set when the utter-
ance contains invocation names of skills on the market, to
capture the user’s potential intent of skill switch.
Another set of features are retrieved by characterizing
the relationship between a user utterance and the current
on-going skill. We leverage the observation that a user’s
command for a skill is typically related to the skill’s prior
communication with the user as well as the skill’s stated
functionalities. We thus propose the following features
to test whether an utterance fits into the on-going skill’s
context: 1) the SR between the utterance and the skill’s
response prior to the utterance, 2) the top-k SR between
the utterance and the sentences in the skill’s description
(we pick k=5), and 3) the average SR between the user’s
utterance and the description sentences.
Results. To assess the effectiveness of UIC, we reuse
the dataset we collected in Section 5.1 that contains real-
world user utterances of context switches. We first manu-
ally label 550 conversations and determine whether each
user utterance is for context switch or not, based on two
experts’ reviews (Cohen’s kappa = 0.64). Since the dataset
is dominated by non-context-switch utterances, we further
balance it by randomly substituting some utterances to
skill invocation utterances collected from skill markets.
In total, we have collected 1,100 context-switch instances
and 1,100 non-context-switch instances as ground truth.
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Using the above features and dataset, we train a clas-
sifier that takes the user’s utterance as input and tells
whether it is a system-related command for context switch
or belongs to the conversation of the current skill. We
train the classifier using different classification algorithms
and 5-folder cross-validation. The results indicate that
random forest achieves the best performance with a pre-
cision of 96.48%, a recall of 95.16%, and F-1 score of
95.82%. Evaluations on an unlabeled real-world dataset
will be described in Section 5.3.
5.3 Overall Detector Evaluation
Next, we integrate the SRC and UIC into a holistic detec-
tor, which raises an alarm on suspicious user-skill interac-
tions whenever SRC or UIC detects any anomaly.
Effectiveness against prototype attacks. To construct
prototype attacks of VMA, we select another 10 popular
skills from skill markets and log transcripts as a user with
61 utterances. We then manually craft skill switch attack
instances (15 in total) by replacing selected utterances
with the invocation utterances intended for the VPA sys-
tem. We also launch faking termination attacks (10 in
total) by substituting the last skill responses with empty
responses or responses that mimicking those from the
VPA system. By feeding all conversations to our detec-
tor, we find that all 25 attack instances are successfully
detected.
Effectiveness on real-world conversations. We further
investigate the effectiveness of our detector on the rest of
real-world conversations which has not been used during
training phase. Although it may not contain real fak-
ing termination attack instances, it does have many user
utterances of context switches. Among them, 341 are
identified by our classifier and 326 are verified manually
to be indeed context switches, indicating that our detec-
tor (the UIC component) achieves a precision of 95.60%.
We are not able to compute the recall due to a lack of
ground truth on this unlabeled dataset. Further analysis
of these instances reveals interesting cases. For example,
we found cases where users thought they were talking to
Alexa during interaction with our skills and ask our skills
to report time, weather, news, to start another skill, and
even to control other home automation devices (details
shown in Appendix B).
Runtime performance. To understand how much perfor-
mance overhead our detector incurs, we measure the de-
tection latency introduced by our detector on a Macbook
Pro with 4-core CPU. On average, the latency is negli-
gible (0.003 ms in average), indicating the lightweight
nature of our detection scheme.
6 Related Work
Security in voice-controlled systems. Diao et al. [16]
and Jang et al. [25] demonstrate that malicious apps can
inject voice commands to control smartphones. Kasmi
et al. [27] applied electromagnetic interference on head-
phone cables and inject voice commands on smartphones.
Hidden voice commands [13], Cocaine noodles [43] and
Dolphin attacks [45] use obfuscated or inaudible voice
command to attack speech recognition systems. Another
line of research [35, 47, 19, 46] focused on securing voice
controllable system through sensors on smartphones to
authenticate the identity of users. All of the above works
attacked and secured voice-controlled device itself while
our work focuses on threats to end users caused by third-
party skills.
Independent from our work, Kumar et al. [30] have
also discovered the voice squatting attack where two invo-
cation names could be pronounced similarly. They further
conducted a measurement study to understand the prob-
lem. In our research, however, we also discovered that a
paraphrased invocation name could hijack the voice com-
mand. In addition, we studied the voice masquerading
attacks and implemented two techniques to mitigate the
voice squatting and voice masquerading attacks.
IoT security. Current home automation security research
focused on the security of IoT devices [24, 40, 38] and the
appified IoT platforms [21, 22, 26, 42]. Ho et al. [24] dis-
covered various vulnerabilities in commercialized smart
locks. Ronen et al. [38] verified worm infection through
ZigBee channel among IoT devices. Fernandes et al. [21]
discovered a series of flaws on multi-device, appified
SmartThings platform. FlowFence [22], ContextIot [26]
and SmartAuth [42] mitigate threats of such IoT platforms
by analyzing data flow or extracting context from third-
party applications. In contrast, our work conducted the
first security analysis on the VPA ecosystems.
Typosquatting and mobile phishing. Similar to our
squatting attacks, Edelman is the first investigated domain
typosquatting [17] and inspired a line of research [41, 28,
10, 33] towards measuring and mitigating such a threat.
However, our work exploited the noisy voice channel
and limitation of voice recognition techniques. On the
other hand, mobile phishing has been intensively stud-
ied [14, 18, 20, 37, 39, 31]. Particularly, Chen et al. [14]
and Fernandes et al. [20] investigate side-channel based
identification of UI attack opportunities. Ren et al. [37]
discovered task hijacking attacks that could be leveraged
to implement UI spoofing. However, we discovered new
attacks on the voice user interface which is very different
from a graphic user interface in user perceptions.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we report the first security analysis of pop-
ular VPA ecosystems and their vulnerability to two new
attacks, VSA and VMA, through which a remote adver-
sary could impersonate VPA systems or other skills to
steal user private information. These attacks are found to
pose a realistic threat to VPA IoT systems, as evidenced
by a series of user studies and real-world attacks we per-
formed. To mitigate the threat, we developed a skill-name
scanner and ran it against Amazon and Google skill mar-
kets, which leads to the discovery of a large number of
Alexa skills at risk and problematic skill names already
published, indicating that the attacks might already hap-
pen to tens of millions of VPA users. Further we designed
and implemented a context-sensitive detector to mitigate
the voice masquerading threat, achieving a 95% precision.
With the importance of the findings reported by the
study, we only made a first step towards fully understand-
ing the security risks of VPA IoT systems and effectively
mitigating such risks. Further research is needed to bet-
ter protect the voice channel, authenticating the parties
involved without undermining the usability of the VPA
systems. To this end, we plan to release our real-world
conversation dataset [7] to help future research in this
direction.
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Appendix A Sample Survey Questions
1. Have you added any words or phrases around skill
name when invoking it (so that it sounds more natu-
rally?) Choose all that apply.
 Yes. Alexa, open Sleep Sounds please.
 Yes. Alexa, open Sleep Sounds for me.
 Yes. Alexa, open Sleep Sounds app.
 Yes. Alexa, open my Sleep Sounds.
 Yes. Alexa, open the Sleep Sounds.
 Yes. Alexa, open some Sleep Sounds.
 Yes. Alexa, tell me a Cat Facts.
 Yes. other (please specify).
 No. I only use simplest forms (e.g. “Alexa,
open Sleep Sounds” ).
2. Please name two skills you use most often.
3. Please give three invocation examples you would use
for each skills you listed above.
4. Have you ever invoked a skill you did not intend to?
(a) Yes.
(b) No.
5. Have you ever tried to invoke a skill during the inter-
action with another skill? (Except when you were
listening to music)
(a) Yes.
(b) No.
6. Have you ever tried to turn up or turn down volume
while interacting with a skill? (Except when you
were listening to music)
(a) Yes.
(b) No.
7. What are the most frequent ways you have used to
quit a skill? Please choose all that apply.
 Alexa, stop.
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 Alexa, cancel.
 Alexa, shut up.
 Alexa, cancel.
 Alexa, never mind.
 Alexa, forget it.
 Alexa, exit.
 Other (please specify).
8. Have you ever experienced saying quit words (like
the ones in the previous question) to a skill that you
intended to quit but did not actually quit it?
(a) Yes.
(b) No.
9. Which indicator did you use most often to know that
a conversation with Alexa is ended?
(a) Alexa says “Goodbye”, “Have a good day” or
something similar.
(b) Alexa does not talk anymore.
(c) The light on the device is off.
(d) Other (please specify).
Appendix B Context switch Examples
Here, we show some interesting examples of context
switches discovered by the detector (Section 5) in real
world conversations collected by skills we published (see
Section 3.4). The examples presented here are transcripts
including user utterances and their prior skill responses.
Skill: Hello, welcome to soothing sleep sounds. Which
sleep sound would you like today?
User utterances for context switch:
• Switch off the TV.
• What time?
• What is the week’s forecast?
• Show me the news.
Skill: Sorry, I do not understand. Which sound do you
want today?
User utterances for context switch:
• Turn off Bluetooth.
• Goodbye, Alexa.
• I meant walk back to the timer.
• Amazon music.
• What’s the weather in Northridge?
• What’s in the news?
• I’m home.
Skill: Hello, welcome to my sleep sounds. Which sleep
sound would you like today?
User utterances for context switch:
• Tell me a quote.
• What was the time?
Skill: Hello, welcome to incredible fast sleep. Which
sleep sound would you like today?
User utterances for context switch:
• What’s my flash briefing?
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